There are over 9,000 public libraries in the United States servicing more than 1.5 billion people and raising over $11.5 billion dollars in revenue with approximately 8% of this total coming from donations. This paper analyzes the determinants of donations to public libraries testing the following hypothesis: is there a crowding-out effect from government funding of public libraries? I address this issue by looking at novel data, the Public Library Survey, and use panel from 2000 to 2013. The results suggest a crowding in effect in all levels of government: 4 to 6 cents in local government, 20 to 23 cents in state government and 75 cents to 1 dollar and 33 cents in federal government. Also, the government expenditure has an inverted U shape.
Introduction
Recent pressure to reduce public budgets have been affecting public libraries all across the country. There are, for example, reports of budget cuts in libraries in New York, Florida, Nebraska, Georgia, Michigan and Oregon 1 (Blau 2011 and Warbuton 2013) . These budget cuts may have a significant negative effect on public libraries, as over 90 percent of their revenues, which accounted for $11.5 billion dollars in 2012, comes from governments (IMLS, 2013) . Thus, such government budget cuts make other components of a library's revenue, namely, donations from private individuals and grants, relatively more important.
In the United States there are 9,082 public libraries, which correspond to approximately 8 percent of all libraries in the country (ALA, 2015) . The Institute of Museums and Library
Services (IMLS, 2013) reported that these public libraries accounted for 1.5 billion in-person visits in 2012. By looking at the libraries' revenue and in-person visits numbers alone, it is possible to understand the importance of public libraries in a public finance perspective.
However, public libraries also provide important services that can be overlooked sometimes, such as Internet access and job searching, for example (ALA 2010 and iPAC 2016) . Moreover, Bhatt (2010) shows that visiting a library increases the time children enrolled in school spend at home reading. In turn, this positively impacts their homework completion rates.
Therefore, given the importance of public libraries as a service versus the losses on revenue due to pressure on budget cuts, this paper focuses on sources of revenue to public libraries. More specifically, this paper aims to evaluate the donations to public libraries at an institutional level, and test the hypothesis of donations being crowded-out by government expenditure. Furthermore, I consider another important feature that may affect donations to libraries, namely, the historic aspects of charity and donations. Hence, I contribute to the growing empirical literature on charitable donations, focusing specifically on public libraries.
Moreover, few studies consider the role played by different locations (i.e., the historic aspects), except for the differences in tax exemption.
With regard to historical aspects, charity in the United States, especially during
Colonial times, was influenced by England. As an example, Americans followed ideas of entrusting some charity responsibilities to local authorities and private agents (Katz 2006) . After the Revolutionary War, however, the environment for charity support was hostile all across the country, except for New England. After several actions from the Supreme Court in the 19th century, charitable activity thrived in the Northeast and upper Midwest. However, these activities did not perform as well in other regions of the country (Katz 2006) . Although demographic changes have occurred since then, most of the institutional framework remains similar as do regional traditions and characteristics. This suggests that regional characteristics may still play a role in donation behavior. Katz (2006) provides a brief discussion about the American interest in giving. The author concludes that "their instinct to imagine and support the non-profit engines of human betterment derive from the original Carnegie-Rockefeller tradition" (Katz 2006 (Katz , 1316 ; in other words, an altruistic behavior. Andreoni (1990) states that people are not indifferent between who makes a donation: themselves or others. Thus, when taking altruism into account, the public goods model provides more intuitive results. Examples of such results are that the distribution of income matters when it comes to donations, governments do not crowd out private provision, and subsidies can have the desired effect on donations (Andreoni 1990 Gruber and Hungerman (2007) and Khanna et al. (1995) , for instance, focus on religion; Beranek et al. (2010) , Bakija et al. (2003) and Peloza and Steel (2005) concentrate on tax systems; Borgonovi (2006) , Steinberg (1991) , Brooks (2003) , Simmons and Emanuele (2004) , Okten and Weisbrod (2000) and Payne (1998) The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the intuitive model and the empirical approach to estimate the crowding effect; Section 3 presents the Public Library Survey data and its descriptive statistics; Section 4 discusses the results; and Section 5 concludes, laying out some implications of study.
Model and Empirical Approach

Model
Individuals try to maximize their utility when donating to a charity. In an aggregate level, it is possible to write
where, is the amount of government revenues, is the characteristics of the donors, and is characteristics of the region. Borgonovi (2006) argues that the interdependent utility model is the base for the charitable donation literature (Abrams and Schmitz, 1984; Reece, 1979; Andreoni and Scholz, 1998; Russel, 2008) . This model can either capture a crowd-in or crowd-out effect, thus it is not restrictive. However, the crowd-out effect is expected to have a quadratic form in an inverted U shape (Brooks, 2003) . Therefore,
Katz (2006) (Clotfelter 1980 , Andeoni 1989 , Brown and Lankford 1992 , Feldstein and Taylor 1976 .
Hence,
Another important feature of the donation literature (Andreoni 1995 , Harbaugh 1998 , Menges et al. 2005 , Crumpler and Grossman 2008 ) is the warm-glow effect. According to the warm-glow literature, donors gain utility when donating, but they are not purely altruistic nor purely egotistic. Crumpler and Grossman (2008) argue that no study has isolated this effect until the present time.
One interesting aspect of donations to institutions is the classification mechanism they use, which can be tightly related to the warm-glow hypothesis. Harbaugh (1998) 
Empirical Approach
Differently from most studies on charitable donations, the Public Library Survey (PLS) dataset does not have observations on donors, but instead on public libraries. Hence, I evaluate the crowding effect from government spending at an institutional level, with a similar framework of the one used by Borgonovi (2006) . The PLS is a rich dataset containing over 50 variables on the features of public libraries across the United States.
Following the intuitive model presented above, I estimate the following equation:
where, is the amount donated to library n, in county c, in state s, in year t;
is the amount of revenues from local government; is the amount of revenues from state government; is the amount of revenues from federal government; are the characteristics of the library n; are the demographic characteristics of the state; , , and are non-observable characteristics of the library, county, and state, respectively; is the time fixed effect; and is the error term.
Unfortunately, I cannot observe donations per se. I can, however, observe other types of revenues, namely, fees, grants and donations. It is expected that the largest share of these "other revenues" are donations, as fees and fines would represent a smaller value. Also, I follow Borgonovi (2006) who argues that it is important to differentiate between the levels of government when analyzing crowding effect.
As discussed in the previous sections, the regional characteristics may influence the level of donation. The vector controls for observable variables such as average age and the percentages of women, white and black people, married couples, immigrants, people with high school degrees and bachelor degrees, unemployed people. The and terms capture nonobservable characteristics, including tax. Also, I created three other dummy variables assuming value of one if the library is either in the New England, Mideast or Great Lakes regions in order to control for the regions highlighted by Katz (2006) .
The variables in the vector are: attendance, kids' programs attendance, book collection, number of employees, number of hours opened, number of computers with access to the Internet for the general public and a dummy variable if the library had any contemporaneous capital outlay.
Data
The Public Libraries Survey (PLS) has been collected annually since 1988 and covers all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and outlying territories. It provides statistics for almost every public library in the United States (IMLS 2013). As the PLS has over a 98 percent response rate, it can be considered a census of public libraries in the United States.
According to the IMLS website, these data are not attached to any specific program, and it is not mandatory. Therefore, there are no incentives to over-or under-report the values in the survey, which makes this data less subject to biased reporting. The PLS survey provides data The data on the characteristics of the states comes from a sample of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series -Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS, 2015) provided by the Minnesota Population Center. The sample is at an individual level, and it was aggregated to state level averages using weights provided by the IPUMS-CPS. Table 1 presents the description of   the variables and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of both datasets used in this paper.
<TABLE 1> <TABLE 2>
I use the IPUMS-CPS variable for deflation and I drop from my sample the 30 observations considered outliers; i.e., libraries with more than $1.4million dollars in real terms.
These observations are described in Table 3 . It is noteworthy that from the 30 dropped observations, 14 of them are the New York Public Library. Figure 1 shows donation versus each level of government expenditure with (above) and without (below) outliers.
<TABLE 3> <FIGURE 1>
Another important feature of the data is the difference in the schedule of the reports. 
Results
Following the literature presented in Section 1, I estimate the model presented in Section 2, and focus on the contribution of government as an explanation for donations to libraries. Besides government revenues, I include state socio-demographics and libraries characteristics. Table 5 presents the OLS regression models. Model (1) is the Pooled OLS and models (2) to (4) have some type of fixed effect -year, county, state and library. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the results focusing on the two issues presented in the previous sections: government, and regional differences.
Following Borgonovi (2006) , the data structure of the Public Library Survey allows me to differentiate the government expenditure on its several levels -local, state and federal. The author shows that for theaters this distinction is significant, and from cents.
With regard to the regional effects, there are some mixed results. At first, there is a difference in the estimated coefficients when introducing the different regional fixed effects.
Moreover, by analyzing Models (1) to (2), being in the Mideast and New England seems to increase donations while being in the Great Lakes seems to decrease donations when controlling for county and year fix effect. Hence, I do not have a clear picture if the historical features described by Katz (2006) are still in place. On the other hand, the results imply that regional unobservable effects affect donations to libraries.
The number of observations in Table 5 is smaller than in the next set of tables because of missing data on the right-hand side variables. Two of these variables included in Table 5 The left-truncated characteristic of the data makes the results presented in Table 5 biased and not consistent. Table 6 presents the results with Tobit estimations. I estimated four models: in model (1) there are only government revenues in the right-hand side, in model (2) there are some library and state control variables, and there is no fixed effect in either of these two models. Model (3) equals model (2) with state fixed effect and model (4) equals model (1) with state and year fixed effect.
<TABLE 6>
All four Tobit models have similar results between them. The results hint at a crowding-in effect in donations and an inverted U shape curve feature at every level of government expenditure. These results suggest local governments crowd-in 6 cents for every dollar spent, state government brings an additional 23 cents, while federal government increases donations by 1 dollar and 33 cents for every dollar spent.
The crowding-in effect when analyzing a cultural sector is not new in the literature. Borgonovi (2006) argues that the crowding-in effect can be explained by a signaling mechanism. Donors would consider libraries that receive government funding as ones with a better reputation, thus more secure in which to invest. Another argument provided by the author is the independent utility framework, "the additional support that public grants provide at low levels of total donative revenues (public and private) allows recipients to expand their activities and undertake new and/or better projects" (Borgonovi 2006, 432) .
According to Borgonovi (2006) and Brooks (2003) , I should find an inverse U shape curve in the government expenditure. In both Table 5 and Table 6 , the results imply such a curve in government expenditure. It is important to stress again that one of the caveats of this paper is not being able to disentangle donations from grants and fees.
Robustness Check
In this subsection I present some other models estimated as robustness checks. First, I
present models with per capita values, using the legal service area as a catchment area. This is an important exercise because not considering a catchment area can lead to overestimated results.
Then, I present the results for all the data; that is, I include the 30 outliers removed earlier as a sensitivity analysis.
Although I controlled for population in the previous estimated equations, this does not capture the catchment area of each library. Therefore, I re-estimated all models in Table 5 and models (1) and (4) in Table 6 . Thus, Table 7 presents the per capita estimation of the POLS model and Fixed Effect models, and Table 8 presents the re-estimated Tobit models.
The estimated per capita models (Table 7 ) present the same features as the Tobit models in Table 6 : there is a positive correlation between donation and all levels of government and an inverted U shape for local and federal government. It is interesting to note that the coefficients have a slight decrease such that the local government would bring around 2 cents, state government 3 cents and federal government 1 dollar and 25 cents. The regional dummies, although statistically significant, are close to zero. As for Table 8 , the Tobit models also have similar results to those of Table 6 , but with smaller coefficients. These results suggest local governments crowd in 4 cents for every additional dollar spent, local governments brings in 20 cents, and federal governments increase donations by 73 cents.
<TABLE 7> <TABLE 8>
Lastly, it is important to make a sensitivity analysis and estimate the models including the outliers removed from previous analysis. Figure 1 , the outliers are most concerning in the relationship between local government and donation. Therefore, I
believe the results presented in Table 6 are more accurate than those in Table 9 .
Conclusion and Implications
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the crowding effect of government expenditure on The results in the regional difference due to historic features described by Katz (2006) were not statistically significant or close to zero, hinting that these regions are not different from other U.S. regions. This provides some evidence that there has been some homogenization in terms of donation, at least to public libraries.
There are several implications from the results presented above. First, the results are another empirical contribution to the crowding effect of government expenditure. As well as other cultural types of activities, such as those analyzed in Paqué (1982) , Okten and Weisbrod (2000) , Smith (2003) , and Borgonovi (2006), government revenues are correlated with more donation. In this particular case, the results imply government crowd in donation in every levellocal, state and federal. This would also corroborate the interpretation from Borgonovi (2006) in which donors use government funding as a signaling mechanism.
Secondly, as a result of the crowd-in effect, the cuts on government budgets to public libraries would mean they are worse than anticipated by policy-makers. For once, there is no guarantee that any level of government would compensate the loss in revenues from another level of government. Moreover, the results indicate that libraries whose revenues are cut would also lose money from donation as well, because donors would have a different perception due to the signaling mechanism.
Lastly, it is important to describe some consequences of these results for public policies.
According to IMLS (2013), 91.8 percent of library revenues come from government; 84.4 percent are local, 6.9 percent are state and 0.5 percent is federal. This breakdown helps to shed light on the reason why every dollar from state and federal governments would bring more dollars from donation. However, it is clear that the biggest providers are local governments.
Even with the extra amount of dollars that state and federal levels can bring, this extra amount would not suffice to cover cuts from local governments, at least not in an aggregate level.
Therefore, policy-makers should be cautious when cutting funds from public entities, especially from cultural-type entities such as public libraries because: (i) there seems to be an indirect budget effect that could further decrease revenues due to the suggested crowd-in effect;
(ii) there might not be a substitution allowed in donation, i.e., donors could not reallocate a donation to a library into another public provided service, which could place more pressure on local governments; (iii) the direct cuts may force public libraries to close, which can have negative externalities, for instance, less access to the Internet and to jobs (ALA 2010 and iPAC 2016), a negative impact on education (Bhatt, 2010) , and less tax-revenue if people value living close to libraries (Sheppard, 2010), among others.
Some of the caveats of this paper are the donation measure and level of observation. For the former, I cannot disentangle donation from grants and fees; therefore, I cannot conclude there is a casual effect between donation and government funding. At most, the results show they have a positive correlation between them. The ideal dataset would enable me to observe the characteristics of donors and the institutions to which they donate. Hence, I would be able to have better measurements to test the warm-glow hypothesis and to understand the relationship between donation and government expenditure. However, I must highlight that this does not invalidate this work, which still provides interesting results using novel data to analyze the determinants of donation. 352.13 Notes: a *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Library Control: in (2) -Population, TotalStaff, Visits, BookVolume; in (3) - 
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